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Executive Summary
In Massachusetts, quasi-public agencies perform vital government functions, delivering essential services such as 
operating public buses and rail systems, 
delivering drinking water and managing 
public pensions. They employ thousands 
of people and sometimes control billion-
dollar budgets. Because they are not 
directly accountable to the legislature 
and exempt from many kinds of public 
oversight, these agencies should make 
their decisions and budgets especially 
open to public scrutiny. Detailed 
information should be publicly disclosed 
and readily available about expenditures, 
revenue and debt, as well as about outside 
contracts and internal governance. The 
Internet makes it easy to provide ready 
access to this information at minimal 
cost.
Unfortunately, quasi-public author-
ities operate largely under the radar 
in Massachusetts. Quasi-publics fail 
to disclose basic information online 
about their spending and revenues. 
When information is available, it is 
difficult for the public to access.  
This study uses data provided to us by 
the quasi-public agencies in response to 
public records requests, as well as public 
audits and online searches, to examine the 
size and scope of quasi-public agencies in 
Massachusetts and the extent to which 
their budgets and decision-making are 
open to the public. 
Quasi-public agencies are a large 
and important part of government 
operations in the Commonwealth.
Quasi-public agencies are publicly •	
chartered bodies that perform some 
public function and are controlled by 
government-appointed boards. They 
are not fully public because they 
operate independently of the legis-
lative and executive branches and 
do not principally depend on state 
general funds for operation. They 
cannot be classified as private entities 
because they are governed by state 
appointees and are typically endowed 
with public powers to collect fees or 
other revenues, as well as to perform 
public functions.
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A total of 42 quasi-public agencies •	
operate on the state or regional level 
in Massachusetts, ranging in size 
from more than 6,000 employees to 
only six.
For the 41 quasi-public agencies •	
for which some budget information 
could be obtained, combined annual 
revenues amounted to $8.76 billion, 
according to available information 
that is sometimes a couple of years 
old. Some authorities, such as the 
Massachusetts Teacher Retirement 
System, oversee over $2 billion in 
outlays annually. 
By comparison, the state budget •	
of Massachusetts was almost $27 
billion in fiscal year 2008, the current 
reference year for most available 
quasi-public data. In other words, 
quasi-public agencies represent 
almost 33 percent of additional 
government activity that is exempt 
from even limited normal trans-
parency and oversight rules. While 
the Commonwealth held $19 billion 
in long-term outstanding debt as of 
March 2008, figures disclosed by the 
Executive Office of Administration 
for 12 large quasi-public agencies 
show $29 billion in additional debt 
at that time.
Quasi-public agencies in the Com-
monwealth often disclose limited or 
no information about their budget or 
operations online, leaving citizens in 
the dark.
While all the agencies in this report •	
have Web sites, only 15 provide 
relatively complete budgetary infor-
mation. The state’s budget Web 
site (mass.gov), the central portal 
for information on Massachusetts 
government finances, fails to provide 
budget information on any quasi-
public agencies.
Some quasi-public agencies appear to •	
perform as models of efficiency and 
good government; others have seen 
repeated scandals and cost overruns.
Concerns about lack of public •	
accountability at quasi-public agencies 
have been raised before. In fact, a 
quarter century ago, the Massachu-
setts Senate convened a commission 
to examine how quasi-public agencies 
were being used to circumvent laws 
to keep track of budget spending 
and debt. The Commission’s recom-
mendations included “that uniform, 
regular reporting requirements be 
imposed and enforced on all authori-
ties” and that the Governor’s office 
disclose all off-budget spending and 
revenues. Only limited reforms have 
taken place during the intervening 25 
years.
Budget transparency can increase 
efficiency and prevent corruption or 
other potential abuse at quasi-public 
agencies.
Budget transparency allows citizens •	
and elected officials to monitor the 
actions of quasi-public agencies and 
hold them accountable. Improved 
budget reporting is the most 
commonly cited way respondents say 
government can demonstrate greater 
accountability, especially through 
open disclosure and clear reporting.
At least 30 states have established •	
budget transparency Web sites that 
give users access to checkbook-level 
data on government spending and 
allow users to make directed searches.
Unlike Massachusetts, New York’s 
state budget Web site includes budget 
information on quasi-public agencies. 
Budget transparency Web sites with •	
checkbook-level disclosure have 
proven to be a cheap tool to monitor 
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and improve government spending. 
Missouri’s Web site, which is updated 
daily and allows citizens to search 
state expenditures totaling over $20 
billion a year, was created entirely 
with existing staff and revenues. 
Budget transparency Web sites can •	
save governments money. In Texas, 
the Comptroller was able to utilize 
the transparency Web site to quickly 
save $2.3 million from a variety of 
efficiencies and cost savings.
Citizens have actively used existing •	
budget transparency sites to monitor 
government spending. Less than a 
year after its launch, the Missouri 
budget transparency Web site 
received more than six million hits.
Massachusetts has made some 
strides toward improving government 
budget transparency, but quasi-publics 
have been exempt from these efforts.
The Commonwealth’s cutting-edge 
procurement system already puts some 
government contracts online, but not 
those of quasi-publics. Massachusetts 
has been a leader in publicly disclosing 
information about spending of stimulus 
funds from the federal American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act by posting all 
contracts online. This public disclosure 
has not extended to quasi-publics. Citi-
zens increasingly expect that government 
expenditures will be posted online and 
easily accessible through a Google-like 
search function. It is important that in-
dependent agencies are included in such 
transparency.
Massachusetts must hold quasi-
public agencies to higher standards of 
transparency and accountability.
The Commonwealth’s centralized •	
Web site, mass.gov, should provide 
budget information on all govern-
ment organizations and agencies, 
including quasi-publics, modeled on 
best practices established by at least 
30 other states.
In addition to information about •	
individual direct expenditures, often 
called checkbook-level transpar-
ency, online budget disclosure should 
include detailed budgetary informa-
tion on all revenue, the issuance of 
private revenue bonds, compensa-
tion for board members, subsidies, 
discretionary spending, and contracts 
or grants given to private entities.
Minutes of board meetings should be •	
posted on-line, as should the qualifi-
cations of board members and their 
compensation for serving on the 
board.
Massachusetts should consider estab-•	
lishing oversight boards to monitor 
the actions of quasi-public agencies 
and hold them accountable.
Contracting at quasi-public agencies •	
should be done through transpar-
ent statewide procurement systems, 
which could most easily be accom-
plished by posting all procurement 
through the state’s Comm-PASS 
system. Doing so would enable these 
entities to take advantage of bulk 
ordering discounts enjoyed by other 
state departments, cities and towns.
Quasi-publics should be barred •	
from hiring lobbyists. As part of the 
government themselves, they should 
not use tax dollars to influence legis-
lation or decisions by the Governor’s 
office. The Governor of New Jersey 
in February 2010 ordered all state 
agencies, authorities, boards and 
commissions to stop hiring lobbyists, 
and Governor Patrick has included 
a similar proposal in the FY2011 
budget.
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Introduction
Much of the contact that Mas-sachusetts citizens have with state government is actually with 
“quasi-public agencies” that operate 
basic infrastructure or other functions, 
including school construction, public 
pensions, college loans, zoos, and as-
sistance with financing health care. 
Most people think of these entities as 
simply part of the government, but that 
isn’t quite true. Though chartered by 
government and ultimately the fiscal re-
sponsibility of taxpayers, the budgets of 
quasi-public agencies are exempt from 
legislative review and governmental 
limitations on debt. 
This independence can make quasi-
public agencies useful tools for carrying 
out specific government purposes, but it 
can also create problems. Quasi-public 
agencies are governed by independent 
boards rather than accountable to the 
voters or elected officials. Quasi-public 
agencies are also exempt from many 
budgetary rules that other parts of gov-
ernment must follow. Given the lack 
of built-in accountability to rules and 
democratic oversight, quasi-publics 
should have more transparency than 
other parts of government, not less.
The problem is not that quasi-publics 
are inherently corrupt or incompetent. 
On the contrary, some quasi-public 
agencies in Massachusetts are regarded 
as models of professionalism and boast 
impressive achievements. The Mas-
sachusetts Water Resources Authority 
(MWRA), for example, is often lauded 
for its cleanup of Boston Harbor, which 
had been considered America’s dirtiest 
harbor in 1980s. Two lawsuits forced the 
creation of an independent authority, the 
MWRA, with strong powers that oversaw 
construction of the ambitious Deer Island 
waste facility on-time and under budget.1 
According to the MWRA history, “In 
order to fulfill its mission of providing 
quality water and sewerage services to its 
communities, the Metropolitan District 
Commission (MDC) needed the ability 
to raise sufficient revenues to hire ad-
equate staff, to properly maintain plants 
and equipment, to finance major capital 
programs, and to develop operating bud-
gets that were responsive to existing and 
future needs. Under the system that ex-
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isted, it was impossible to achieve these 
goals.”2 Creation of the quasi-public 
MWRA filled that need.
Another example of creation of a 
quasi-public agency that helped address 
long-standing problems is the Mas-
sachusetts School Building Authority 
(MSBA).3 When the agency was created 
in 2004, it inherited a list of 428 schools 
on a backed-up waiting list with 10-15 
year delays and an audit backlog of 
over 800 projects. These programs had 
struggled without dedicated revenues 
under the direction of the Department 
of Education’s school building assistance 
program. The MSBA received a dedi-
cated penny of the state’s sales tax, and 
restructured the program as a competi-
tive grant process based on standardized 
needs assessment. The authority ended 
future waiting lists by committing only 
to projects for which money could 
be expected that year. The authority 
accelerated payments by $4.4 billion 
more in the first five years than would 
have been possible under the previous 
system. Overall costs of the program 
were reduced by almost $900 million, 
and cities, towns and the regional school 
district saved nearly $2.8 billion due to 
lower interest costs. The authority also 
conducted the first-ever inventory of all 
the state’s schools.
But lack of accountability at quasi-
publics has at other times bred high-
profile scandals or cost overruns such 
as the well-known problems associated 
with the Big Dig or earlier days at Mass-
port. The point is not that quasi-public 
agencies are inherently good or bad. 
They manage huge public resources 
and have a heightened need for trans-
parency. Transparency is a crucial tool 
in a democracy, as it fosters account-
ability by enabling voters, the media 
and government watchdogs to monitor 
the decisions of government officials. 
Transparency can also make government 
more efficient by highlighting ways to 
benchmark and ratchet up performance 
on public goals.
Exactly 25 years ago, in 1985, the 
Massachusetts Senate Ways and Means 
Committee issued a report recom-
mending a moratorium on the growth 
of public authorities. Senator Patricia 
McGovern, the committee chair at the 
time, forcefully explained her concerns: 
“It is true that authorities, with their 
freedom and flexibility, can make things 
happen, but they also have the best of 
both worlds. They can have posh offices 
like private companies, and they can 
operate without fear of failure because 
the state will pick up the tab.”4 The com-
mittee concluded that this “best of both 
worlds” environment can lead to abuse 
and misuse of public funds. 
This report follows in the footsteps 
of that report a quarter century ago 
in documenting the important role of 
quasi-publics and calling for greater 
transparency and accountability. Rely-
ing on public records requests, online 
searches and state audits, we examine the 
size and scope of quasi-public agencies 
in Massachusetts and the extent to which 
their budgets and decision-making are 
open to viewing through public Web 
sites.
These publicly accessible and search-
able Web sites have become almost syn-
onymous with enhanced transparency 
and public accountability around the 
country. Other states increasingly pro-
vide citizens and government watchdogs 
with one-stop Web portals that allow 
comprehensive searches of transactions 
down to the checkbook level. When 
addressing the lack of transparency at 
quasi-public agencies, Massachusetts 
should accept no less.
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Quasi-public agencies are indepen-dent governmental corporations that are created through enabling 
legislation to perform a particular service 
or set of public functions. They are tech-
nically public entities and often exercise 
public powers; but they remain relatively 
independent of the government that 
founded them. The directors of these 
agencies, who are usually appointed for 
extended periods, are empowered to make 
operational decisions independent of the 
legislature. 
Quasi-public agencies operate on the 
federal, state and local levels, operating 
basic services such as waste management, 
toll roads or water treatment, or acting 
as a financial conduit for housing, com-
munity development or public pensions. 
As senior editor for Boston magazine, John 
Strahinich, described their role in a 1989 
article: “Neither fish nor fowl, authorities 
exist in the twilight zone between the 
public and private sectors. They travel 
in this other dimension, out of sight and 
sound of the general public, performing 
the necessary tasks that the public sec-
tor can’t perform and the private sector 
won’t.”5
Regardless of whether ordinary public 
agencies could perform these functions, 
the strength and independence of quasi-
public agencies derive largely from their 
self-financing powers. Quasi-public 
agencies are allowed to raise their own 
revenue, and their budgets are not sub-
ject to legislative oversight. Quasi-public 
agencies typically receive the majority of 
their income from fees they collect, such 
as tolls or rents. Many also raise money 
by issuing tax-exempt bonds, which they 
are empowered to do as a result of their 
public status. These tax-exempt bonds 
are backed by the revenue-generating 
power of the agency itself, and – in theory 
if not in practice – are not backed by the 
“full faith and credit” of the state. Thus, 
quasi-public agencies can borrow money 
without damaging the credit rating of 
the Commonwealth. They are similarly 
What Is a Quasi-Public Agency?
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not subject to the limitations or caps on 
governmental debt. They are also exempt 
from civil service rules and contract 
bidding procedures, even though many 
agencies in Massachusetts are subsidized 
by taxpayer dollars. Of the Big Five 
authorities – the Turnpike, Massport, 
Convention Center, Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority, and the Mas-
sachusetts Water Resources Authority 
– only Massport operates without direct 
funding from taxpayers.6
Quasi-public agencies are often re-
ferred to by other names, such as spe-
cial-purpose entities, special purpose 
governments, or quasi-public authorities. 
An additional distinction is sometimes 
made between two types of quasi-public 
agencies – special districts, which have 
taxing powers in other states, and public 
authorities, which rely on user fees and 
the bond market. For the purposes of this 
report, “quasi-public agency” or “quasi” 
describes both types of agencies. 
Rise of Quasi-Public Agencies 
in the United States
Though relatively rare before the 1950s, 
quasi-public agencies have existed since 
the foundation of the colonies. In recent 
decades they have become increasingly 
prevalent, and the most numerous and 
fastest growing form of government in 
the United States.7 Between 1952 and 
1992, the number of quasi-public agencies 
increased by 156 percent.8 Due to differing 
definitions and a lack of systematic data, 
the counts of quasi-public agencies vary 
considerably. One estimate of the number 
of publicly chartered authorities in the 
United States ranges anywhere from 5,000 
to 18,000.9 Another estimate, based on 
Census counts of “special district govern-
ments,” tallied 37,389 such entities across 
the United States in 2007.10
The rise of quasi-publics is fueled by at 
least four factors:
The need to bridge across local juris-•	
dictions for new or expanded govern-
ment operations;
The desire to borrow money for •	
projects outside of newly created debt 
limits or to take advantage of new 
financial instruments for borrowing 
more cheaply;
The desire to circumvent corrupt or •	
inefficient political machines, or to at 
least appear to create professional and 
“business-like” operations outside of 
political influence;
Urging by private companies for new •	
quasi-public agencies that will partner 
or contract with their own planned 
investment opportunities.
One of the initial motivators for the 
growth of quasis was the need to provide 
public services across political boundaries. 
During the 1800s in particular, there were 
numerous interdependent but politically 
“Independent Agencies” and  
“Quasi-Public Agencies” 
“Independent agencies” are not the same as 
quasi-public agencies. An independent agency is 
any agency created by the legislature that remains 
independent of other executive departments. Well 
known independent agencies at the federal level 
include the Central Intelligence Agency, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency, and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency. Quasi-public 
agencies are a sub-type of independent agencies. 
The chief distinction is that quasi-public agencies 
are granted self-financing powers, such as the abil-
ity to issue bonds or charge for a service. Other 
kinds of independent agencies do not have the 
ability to self-finance, leaving them dependent on 
budgetary allocations from the government that 
established them and therefore subject to greater 
legislative oversight and control. 
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decentralized metropolitan areas. In this 
political environment, local governments 
realized that they needed to combine 
resources to provide services to a given 
region, regardless of political boundar-
ies. In 1790, for example, the City of 
Philadelphia and 10 neighboring suburbs 
negotiated the creation of the Board of 
Prison Inspectors to provide prison ser-
vices across the region.11 
This need to provide services across 
political boundaries became more im-
portant during the late 1800s and early 
1900s, when state legislatures, dominated 
by rural and suburban areas, began pass-
ing laws that limited the ability of cities to 
annex outlying areas. Statutes were enact-
ed that were simultaneously permissive to 
the incorporation of municipal areas and 
the formation of special districts. Many 
locales established quasi-public agencies 
as a way to maintain independence from 
nearby cities while also providing services 
to their residents.12 
The second, and probably more im-
portant, reason that governments form 
quasi-public agencies is to enable the 
financing of new investments through 
issuance of new debt. The economic 
depression of the 1870s left many cities, 
which had borrowed heavily in boom 
times, with large levels of debt. States 
responded by passing limits on public 
debt to avoid defaults in the future. These 
limitations led some to fear that govern-
ments would simply raise taxes, causing 
some groups to successfully lobby for 
limitations on additional taxation. As a 
result, local governments were left in a 
fiscal straitjacket – they were unable to 
raise taxes and faced low debt ceilings. 
Quasi-public agencies, which courts ruled 
were exempt from such fiscal limitations, 
provided a solution for these govern-
ments, especially when they sought to 
fund their capital-intensive projects.13 
Cities, counties and states could raise 
money by forming quasi-public agen-
cies, without affecting their restrictive 
debt levels.
In this respect, the growing im-
portance of quasi-public agencies was 
brought about by the combination of 
new legal limits on government debt 
with new financial instruments that 
courts decided were exempt from those 
debt limits. The debt limits were meant 
to protect state and local governments 
from financial default and to reassure pri-
vate investors that governments would 
have enough money to make future 
payments on publicly issued bonds. The 
limits capped how much debt govern-
ments could shoulder or required ballot 
approval to waive such limits. More 
traditional public debt was backed by 
future taxes and paid for through future 
allocations from the general fund bud-
get, leaving bond buyers unsure whether 
heavily indebted governments would re-
ally make bond payments in a fiscal crisis 
rather than, say, pay salaries for police or 
teachers. Courts ruled that debt issued 
by new “revenue bonds” or “special ob-
ligation bonds” was different and should 
not count against the debt limits. These 
new debt instruments were backed by 
consumer user fees or other charges such 
as tolls, water fees, educational or hous-
ing loan repayments, tobacco company 
settlement payments, or even expected 
federal gas tax funds.
The relationship between quasi-public 
authorities and revenue bond financing 
has been so close that modern commen-
tators often treat them as inseparable.14 
Use of these bonds began before World 
War I, grew in profile with their use by 
the New York Port Authority, and took 
off in earnest with federal encourage-
ment during the late 1930s.15 The use 
of revenue bonds to evade or circumvent 
public debt limits is another reason that 
quasi-public agencies should be subject 
to enhanced transparency; but it does not 
mean that these arrangements are nec-
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essarily bad for taxpayers. In many cases 
the use of revenue bonds also reassured 
investors in ways that could translate 
into lower interest rates and therefore 
lower costs for taxpayers. Even when 
municipalities have been empowered to 
issue revenue bonds, they often none-
theless prefer to create an independent 
authority to do so – perhaps because they 
believe doing so reassures bond holders 
or perhaps because elected officials desire 
political distance from ensuing rate hikes 
that are made necessary by the revenue 
bonds.16
Third, quasi-public agencies have 
multiplied because they have been pro-
moted as a way to avoid government 
corruption and political infighting. One 
of the main selling points of quasi-public 
agencies, at least for investors consider-
ing purchase of their bonds, has been 
their relative independence from their 
founding government. Reformers in the 
Progressive movement of the late 1800s 
and early 1900s saw independent agen-
cies run by non-partisan bureaucrats as 
a way to deliver public services free from 
the corrupting influence of politicians.17 
Influenced by these beliefs, President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a particu-
larly strong proponent of quasi-public 
agencies. In announcing the creation of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933, 
Roosevelt described the new entity as a 
“corporation clothed with the power of 
government, but possessed of the flexibil-
ity and initiative of private enterprise.”18 
Roosevelt was wary of the power of po-
litical bosses in cities across the United 
States and used New Deal policies to 
encourage the growth of quasi-public 
agencies instead, even instructing the 
legal department of the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA) to draft over 
500 charters for authorities across the 
nation.19 Many of the federal programs 
Roosevelt created required the forma-
tion of quasi-public agencies in order to 
receive financial assistance. As a result, 
between 1931 and 1941, the number of 
quasi-public agencies increased over 50 
percent, from 1,400 to 2,200.20 
The independence of quasi-publics is 
a double-edged sword. Depending on 
the degree of transparency and public 
accountability, the results can be greater 
professionalism and focus, or corruption 
and unresponsiveness to popular de-
mands. As scholar Alberta Sbragia notes, 
“The same characteristics – financial 
independence, insulation from a wide ar-
ray of constituencies, a narrow functional 
focus, distance from elected officials, a 
dependence on user fees rather than on 
taxes, and an administrative structure 
devoid of many of the regulations and 
restrictions applicable to state and local 
line agencies – are viewed by supporters 
as allowing the authority to function ef-
fectively, flexibly, and quickly, while being 
identified by critics as leading to a lack of 
accountability and oversight that encour-
ages corruption [and] anti-democratic 
tendencies.”
Finally, an additional and more recent 
impetus for creation of quasi-publics is 
that many private developers have urged 
their creation as a way to secure capital 
for expensive infrastructure projects, es-
pecially when the legislature is reluctant 
to seek new taxes. Heavy construction 
contractors, for example, may push for 
the formation of a public authority to 
provide reliable funding for infrastruc-
ture.21 Across the country, developers 
have initiated the creation of hundreds 
of quasi-public agencies to fund devel-
opment-oriented functions. In Houston 
during the 1970s, for instance, develop-
ers initiated the foundation of more than 
400 municipal utility districts, which are 
quasi-public agencies that provide water 
and sewage services.22 Over 130 of these 
special governments were formed in 1971 
alone to serve new or planned residential 
developments in the area.23 
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Quasi-Public Agencies in 
Massachusetts
In Massachusetts, the development of quasi-public agencies followed a similar path as it did nationally. The 
earliest agencies were created to manage 
water resources across municipalities, 
followed by state rescue of insolvent 
private companies operating important 
services. Then, after World War II, the 
number of agencies grew sharply with 
new infrastructure investments, and 
branched into new technology incuba-
tors and financing instruments. 
In the late 19th century, steady growth 
of population and water use in Boston 
led the city to make new agreements with 
nearby cities and towns to divert water 
toward the state’s capital city. In 1895, 
the legislature created the Metropolitan 
Water Commission to manage common 
water resources between Boston and 
nearby cities and towns.24 The water 
commission provided a governance 
structure for continuing efforts to allo-
cate water and address wasteful leakage 
problems. Perhaps equally important, 
the Commission provided a way around 
the Municipal Indebtedness Act of 1875, 
which set a limit at 3 percent of the as-
sessed valuation of taxable property.25
During World War II, the Common-
wealth focused its economic and manu-
facturing powers on the war effort, while 
letting traditional public services fall by 
the wayside. Following the war, the state 
was faced with outdated infrastructure. 
The three governors during the post-war 
period – Robert Bradford, Paul Dever, 
and Christian Herter – sought to mod-
ernize the state’s transportation system. 
They turned to quasi-public agencies as 
a way to finance large-scale infrastructure 
projects without having to borrow money 
or raise taxes. Following their leadership, 
the state legislature created the Mystic 
River Bridge Authority, which became 
part of the Massachusetts Port Author-
ity in 1956.26 Likewise, the Metropolitan 
Transit Authority was created in 1947, 
the Massachusetts Turnpike Author-
ity in 1952, the Massachusetts Parking 
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Authority in 1958, and the Woods Hole-
Martha’s Vineyard-Nantucket Steamship 
Authority in 1960.27
The period from the end of World 
War II to the 1970s involved many con-
flicts between public agencies seeking to 
implement massive urban redevelopment 
and highway projects and local residents 
seeking to preserve their homes or qual-
ity of life. Edward J. King, who was the 
executive director of Massport from 
1961 to 1974, embarked on an ambitious 
Notable Dates in the Early Creation of Massachusetts Quasi-Public Agencies 
1875 – Boston Water Board created to assume control of the Mystic and Cochituate Water Works .
1895 – Metropolitan Water Commission
1918 – Boston Elevated Railway Company (BERC) placed under public control by Governor’s appointees 
and financed with assessments on service communities .
1929 – Boston Transit District, later called Boston Metropolitan District (BMD) and empowered to issue 
bonds for capital improvements for the BERC .
1935 – Local housing authorities authorized
1946 – Mystic River Bridge Authority
1947 – Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) succeeded the BERC
1952 – Turnpike Authority
1955 – Port Authority 
1960 – University of Massachusetts Building Authority 
1960 – Steamship Authority 
1961 – University of Lowell Building Authority 
1963 – State College Building Authority 
1964 – Southeastern Massachusetts University Building Authority 
1964 – Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) replaces MTA and BMD
1965 – Worcester Business Development Corporation 
1968 – Housing Finance Agency 
1975 – Government Land Bank 
          – Community Development Finance Corporation 
          – Municipal Wholesale Electric Company 
1978 – Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation
          – Technology Development Corporation 
          – Industrial Finance Agency
1981 – Bay State Skills Corporation
1981 – Educational Loan Authority
1982 – Corporation for Educational Telecommunications
          – Technology Park Corporation
          – Convention Center Authority
1984 – Water Resources Authority (MWRA)
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project to expand Logan Airport from a 
small regional airport to one of the busiest 
airports in the world. His proposals were 
vociferously opposed by residents in the 
nearby communities who worried about 
subsequent air and noise pollution. King 
continued with the project, counting on 
the support from bankers, state legislators, 
union officials and contractors. As the head 
of a quasi-public agency, King was neither 
required to involve the public in develop-
ing plans for the airport, nor was he directly 
accountable to elected leaders. In fact, even 
when he was eventually fired, he continued 
to show up for work until a compromise 
was brokered that guaranteed him a gen-
erous severance payment and a letter of 
commendation from the board. 28
Despite this opposition, more quasi-
public agencies were established over 
the years as governors sought to take 
advantage of their independent financing 
powers. Governor Endicott Peabody and 
the legislature created the Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority in 1964 
as a restructuring and expansion of the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, which 
was riddled with debt. Two years later, he 
also established the Massachusetts Health 
and Education Facilities Authority and the 
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency.29 
Facing default in August 1975, the latter 
agency was rescued by the Massachusetts 
Legislature, which placed $500 million in 
state debt as collateral to back the agencies’ 
financial notes.  When other local housing 
authorities the following year also became 
unable to continue financing their opera-
tions through short-term debt, the Com-
monwealth was forced to issue $535 million 
in state bonds to prevent default.30
The 1970s and 1980s saw rapid prolif-
eration of quasi-public agencies, and they 
comprised a growing share of the state’s ac-
tivity. In 1984 alone, the legislature created 
six new quasi-public agencies, including the 
Massachusetts Water Resources Authority, 
which was charged with cleaning up Boston 
Harbor and repairing the water delivery 
and sewage treatment systems.
 In 1985, though, members of the state 
legislature began raising concerns about 
the growing prominence of quasi-public 
agencies. A Senate Ways and Means 
Committee report that year found 24 
statewide authorities, 5 major regional 
authorities and 477 regional and local 
authorities for a total of 506. Among this 
total, the most common types of local 
authorities were  housing authorities, of 
which there were 223. The study also 
found 79 regional school districts, 78 
local water, sewer and fire authorities, 
44 local redevelopment authorities, 27 
home care corporations, 14 regional 
transit authorities, 4 solid waste districts, 
and 8 other quasi-public entities, includ-
ing the Woburn Golf and Ski authority. 
Together these entities employed over 
12,000 people and spent over $2 billion 
annually.31
The Senate Ways and Means Com-
mittee also warned that the state was on 
a dangerous path of a growing form of 
“shadow government.” The Commission 
recommended “that uniform, regular 
reporting requirements be imposed and 
enforced on all authorities” and that the 
Governor’s office disclose all off-budget 
spending and revenues.32 Such reforms 
have not taken place during the interven-
ing 25 years.
Measuring the Extent of 
Quasi-Public Agencies in 
Massachusetts
Counting the number of quasi-public 
agencies is a challenge of information 
gathering and interpretation. Each gov-
ernment uses different language when 
founding an independent authority, and 
scholars haven’t developed a standard 
definition for what a quasi-public agency 
even is. 
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This report focuses on state and re-
gional quasi-public agencies, also known 
within government as “quasis.” These 
are publicly chartered bodies that are 
controlled by a largely government-
appointed board. They are funded by 
sources outside of state general funds, 
though the state would presumably inter-
vene to protect them from insolvency.
Under this definition, 42 state or re-
gional quasi-public agencies operate in 
Massachusetts, ranging in size from more 
than 6,000 employees at the MBTA to 
only six employees at the Massachusetts 
Technology Development Corporation. 
Most of these authorities have statewide 
responsibilities, which provide services 
such as housing assistance and a retire-
ment fund for teachers. These agencies 
include the Commonwealth Corpora-
tion, Commonwealth Health Insurance 
Connector Authority, the Massachusetts 
School Building Authority, and the Mas-
sachusetts Teachers Retirement System. 
Other agencies have a more regional 
focus, including the 15 regional transit 
authorities, which are responsible for de-
veloping, financing and operating public 
transportation services in their regions. 
The Web site for the MetroWest RTA, 
for example, defines their mission as to 
“[b]uild a public transportation system 
to deliver convenient and dependable 
service that enhances mobility, environ-
mental quality and economic vitality in 
the region.”33  
Quasi-public agencies that are crea-
tures of municipal government, or that 
deal with explicitly local (as opposed to 
regional) issues, are excluded from this 
study. (A complete listing of the agencies 
included in this study is available in the 
Appendix.)
Because our analysis focuses on avail-
able budget data for 2008, it does not 
reflect the more recent consolidation 
of the state’s transportation agencies. In 
June 2009, Governor Patrick signed a 
transportation reform law, eliminating 
the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority 
and consolidating governance of the many 
transportation-related organizations 
under one super-agency, a new quasi-
public agency known as the Massachusetts 
Department of Transportation (Mass-
DOT). Described as a new authority with 
“agency like” features, MassDOT has the 
authority to raise money and issue bonds, 
and is run by an independent Board of 
Directors appointed by the Governor. 
The Size and Transparency of Quasi-Public Agencies in Massachusetts
Number of quasi-public agencies: 42
Average expenditures per quasi-public agency: $219 million
Known revenues of quasis as a percent of the state budget: 33%
Number of employees in 17 quasis for which information was provided: 9,168
Number of quasis with detailed budget information on their Web sites: 15
“Off-budget” debt held by dozen large quasis compared to debt of entire 
Commonwealth: 153%
Percent of quasis with detailed budget information on their Web sites: 36%
Number of quasis with checkbook-level detail or searchable budget information on 
state’s budget Web site: 0
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For the 41 quasis for which some bud-
get information was available, revenues 
averaged approximately $219 million 
for each entity. Together, the combined 
annual revenues flowing to these quasi-
public agencies amounted to $8.76 bil-
lion. This sum represents a roughly 33 
percent addition to the Commonwealth’s 
nearly $27 billion state budget.34
Measured by identifiable expenditures 
for these authorities, their total spending 
was somewhat lower at $7.4 billion. The 
difference is partly due to availability 
of data from fewer agencies and partly 
because our analysis was conservative 
in distinguishing expenditures from fi-
nancial debt payments. No expenditure 
data was available from the Steamship 
Authority, which did not respond to our 
Public Records requests, though revenue 
data for the authority was available from 
an external audit. Similarly, the Com-
monwealth Zoo Corporation refused to 
share any financial data.
Another indication of the size of qua-
sis is the number of people they employ 
and the wages they pay. Even though the 
quasis are major employers in the state, 
basic information about the number of 
people they employ is generally not pro-
vided. Seventeen quasi-public agencies 
provided this information, indicating that 
they employ 9,168 people, an average 
of 540 employees each. The 14 agen-
cies for which we reviewed payroll data 
spent nearly $172 million on wages and 
salaries, approximately $12 million per 
agency, not including health care or other 
benefits. (Lack of this data in our study 
does not necessarily mean that agencies 
failed to respond to a formal request. 
Our study did not ask all agencies for 
this data).
Examining the compensation packages 
of board members at the agencies is also 
eye opening. In 2009, Governor Patrick 
established a committee to review com-
pensation decisions for board members 
at the state’s quasi-public agencies.35 
The commission found that while the 
salaries for most executives passed a ba-
sic reasonableness test, the process for 
determining compensation levels was 
flawed and lacked adequate transparency. 
In particular, the compensation packages 
contained outlier features the commis-
sion found to be inappropriate, such as 
“excessive severance pay requirements, 
guaranteed raises and bonuses, and exces-
sive sick pay cash out.”36 A report released 
by the commission provided figures on 
the salaries and compensation packages 
for the executive directors of the agen-
cies. The average compensation package 
was valued at $185,991. They ranged in 
value from $79,903 at the Berkshire RTA 
to $367,000 at the Pensions Reserves 
Investment Management Board.37
Outstanding agency debt is also an 
important measure of quasi-public agen-
cies because they often act as conduits for 
issuing public debt. Indeed, the nearly 
$29 billion in long-term outstanding 
debt for public authorities far outstrips 
the $19 billion in debt held by the Com-
monwealth. A potential problem, of 
course, is that while this debt may make 
sense for individual quasi-publics, it may 
not make sense from the point of view 
of the Commonwealth, which would 
ultimately be responsible for this debt. 
The Commonwealth may not be able to 
afford this aggregate debt or it may pose 
dangerous burdens in case of future crises 
in the financial markets. 
Lack of Adequate 
Transparency and 
Democratic Accountability
Quasi-public agencies in Massachu-
setts overwhelmingly fail to provide 
public access to their budget information. 
The state’s budget Web site, for example, 
does not provide financial information 
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on any of the agencies included in this 
report. And while all of the agencies have 
their own Web sites, only 15 provide 
relatively complete information about 
their revenue and expenditures. Four 
other agencies offer incomplete data, 
and one agency requires registration to 
access its budgetary information.43 Not a 
single quasi provides for easy or detailed 
examination of the agency’s checkbook 
the way departments do in many other 
states. (See Appendix for agency by 
agency findings.)
A similar lack of budget transparency 
exists among the Regional Transit Au-
thorities (RTAs). Of the 15 RTAs, only 
three (Martha’s Vineyard, Worcester and 
Nantucket) provide budget information 
in the form of an annual report on their 
local Web site.44 An especially savvy re-
searcher could discover that by going to 
a federal transit Web site it is possible 
to find some detailed budget informa-
tion for 14 of the agencies; however, the 
information is very difficult to find and 
the most recent budget reports are from 
2007.45 The leadership of the Regional 
Transit Authorities at the newly created 
Massachusetts Department of Transpor-
tation (MassDOT) has indicated that they 
plan to include RTA budget information 
on the RTA Web site (www.matransit.
com) and provide a link to the RTA Web 
site from the new MassDOT site (www.
massdot.state.ma.us). The RTA Web site 
is still under construction.46
Though the staffs at many quasis were 
willing to supply information to us fol-
lowing a formal request, it is impractical 
to rely on such active cooperation for 
independent monitoring of these agen-
cies. Some quasis did not even cooperate 
with requests for information. Staff at 
the Commonwealth Zoo Corporation, 
Recent Reforms on Tracking Quasi-Public Debt
Recent reforms have improved the transparency and oversight of quasi-public agency 
debt. In August 2008 the legislature created a new Financial Advisory Board to oversee 
the aggregate public debt across the Commonwealth including, explicitly, quasi-public 
agencies and independent authorities. The board, overseen by the Treasurer and four 
appointees of the governor, is tasked with examining potential problems with aggregate 
debt and providing particular scrutiny over any financial derivative products that public 
entities might wish to use in issuing debt. The Financial Advisory Board’s report cov-
ers 12 large quasi-public agencies (called “public authorities”) plus the Regional Transit 
Agencies, the Convention Center and five other quasis that don’t issue their own debt.38 
Although the tally appears nowhere in the report, it documents almost $29 billion in 
long-term outstanding debt for these public authorities as of March 31, 2008, compared 
to $19 billion in debt for the Commonwealth.39
The administration has created other mechanisms to increase accountability and 
transparency for Massachusetts debt in ways that, however, do not include quasi-public 
agencies.40 The Executive Office of Finance and Administration set clear goals for keeping 
debt service within prescribed limits “to ensure that the amount of debt issued to fund the 
capital investment program is kept to affordable levels,” but excluded certain quasi-public 
debt from those limits.41 The agency similarly conducted the first-ever Debt Affordability 
Analysis and excluded quasi-public agencies from this study, even though it made clear that 
the Commonwealth is ultimately responsible for meeting the obligations of this debt.42
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for example, refused to provide any 
budgetary information and claimed they 
were not subject to public records laws. 
The Steamship Authority never com-
plied with our repeated public records 
requests; but we were able to locate 
revenue data from a separate state Audi-
tor’s report. This lack of transparency 
is particularly problematic in light of 
the large volume of economic activity 
generated through these agencies.47 
Given their prominent role and po-
tential impact on the public in the state, 
quasis must be held more accountable 
with their budget information acces-
sible to decision makers and the public. 
Democratic institutions are more effec-
tive and responsive to public needs when 
they can be held publicly accountable 
and their actions are transparent. For 
quasi-public agencies, however, ac-
countability poses special challenges 
that can lead to serious problems.
Quasi-public agencies have extraor-
dinary control over their budgets and 
do not rely solely or often even sig-
nificantly on an annual appropriation 
from the legislature. Quasis are there-
fore less accountable to their founding 
governments. A report released by the 
Massachusetts Quasi-Public Authority 
Compensation Review Commission 
noted that quasi-public agencies fall in 
a unique oversight void. Compensa-
tion decisions for public companies, for 
example, are reviewed by shareholder 
rights organizations, while not-for-
profits are regulated by the IRS and the 
state’s Attorney General, and the deci-
sions of state agencies are reviewed by 
the executive and legislative branches. 
Quasi-public agencies, however, retain 
complete control and discretion over 
their budgets and compensation prac-
tices. The commission noted that public 
authorities don’t even have a standard 
operating procedure for setting com-
pensation packages.48
In addition to not being directly 
elected or accountable to the legislature, 
it is difficult for the public to hold quasi-
public agencies accountable through 
executive branch oversight. Quasis are 
designed to be insulated from political 
pressure. The governor (or the person in 
charge of appointing agency boards) can 
distance himself or herself from politi-
cally unpopular decisions made by the 
authority. Accountability is also reduced 
by holdover appointees from previous 
administrations, who may hold sharply 
differing views from the current sitting 
governor. At most quasi-public agencies, 
high-level staff can only be removed 
before their term expires with proof of 
gross negligence. In a Massachusetts 
Supreme Court case over the removal of 
two members of the Turnpike Author-
ity, Justice Francis X. Spina explained 
in the majority opinion that board 
members “were not appointed to carry 
out the policies of the governor, but the 
policies of the authority as determined by 
themselves”49 (emphasis added).
This lack of direct oversight is ex-
acerbated by the fact that quasi-public 
agencies lack the kind of public account-
ability that exists when information about 
budgets and activities is widely available. 
The ability to see how government uses 
the public purse is fundamental to de-
mocracy. Budget transparency checks 
corruption, bolsters public confidence 
in government, and promotes fiscal re-
sponsibility. In 1802, President Thomas 
Jefferson called for budget transparency 
in a letter to the Secretary of Treasury, 
Albert Gallatin, “…We might hope to 
see the finances of the Union as clear 
and intelligible as a merchant’s books, 
so that every member of Congress and 
every man of any mind in the Union 
should be able to comprehend them, to 
investigate abuses, and consequently to 
control them.”50 Quasi-public agencies, 
however, lack this sort of transparency.
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The lack of transparency and ac-
countability is especially problematic 
given the fact that many quasi-public 
agencies, while technically independent, 
nonetheless receive some sort of direct or 
indirect government outlays. In 2008, for 
example, the Commonwealth Corpora-
tion received over $30 million in grants 
from the federal and state governments 
– an amount almost equal to the agency’s 
entire budget.51 While the budgets of 
quasi-public agencies are technically 
independent, taxpayers would likely be 
responsible in the event of an agency 
insolvency. Last year, for example, the 
MassPike was faced with the prospect 
of paying $2 million a month as inter-
est on its loans, a catastrophic sum for 
an agency already facing a $100 million 
deficit. In response, the Commonwealth 
passed legislation to guarantee $800 mil-
lion of the authority’s debt, allowing it to 
refinance with the state’s superior credit 
rating. While this protected the agency 
from possible insolvency, it left the tax-
payers responsible for $800 million if the 
authority defaults.52 
In the absence of oversight and trans-
parency, quasi-public agencies lack or-
dinary checks on the use of government 
resources to reward political supporters 
and secure continuing fealty. Public of-
ficials may be tempted to use positions 
as gifts to be dispensed. Director-level 
positions, in particular, are desirable to 
political supporters because of their large 
paychecks, prestige and substantial auton-
omy from outside control. The average 
compensation package at the state-level 
agencies is $185,991, with some directors 
earning upwards of $300,000 per year.53 
Positions on the boards of quasi-public 
agencies can also serve as political prizes, 
especially when few duties are entailed 
and large compensation is included. 
Stacking a board with political support-
ers, moreover, gives a public official the 
ability to exert influence over the agencies 
even after they have left office.
The stakes can be high. After 9/11, 
for example, transportation security 
experts questioned the credentials of the 
management team at Logan Airport, the 
top members of which had been political 
appointments. Following the September 
11th attacks, Massachusetts launched an 
investigation into Massport to determine 
whether the agency’s actions left the 
airport, and the nation, vulnerable to ter-
rorism. The investigation, known as the 
Carter Commission, cleared the agency 
of any responsibility for the attacks, but 
found that political patronage was an 
endemic problem that contributed to 
inefficiencies at the agency. They noted in 
particular that political patronage eroded 
the public’s confidence in the agency 
and hurt the morale of loyal employees. 
The Carter Commission concluded that 
job applicants for Massport should be 
examined for their qualifications, and 
the board agreed to form screening 
committees and adopt minimum quali-
fications for candidates in top positions. 
The changes however, only applied to 
Massport and not the other quasi-public 
agencies within the Commonwealth.
The Big Dig exemplifies the potential 
for fiscal irresponsibility when quasi-
public agencies lack adequate transpar-
ency and public oversight. The project, 
managed by project manager Bechtel/
Parsons Brinkerhoff, was initially esti-
mated to cost about $5 billion in 1991, 
but poor management coupled with other 
factors led to a final price of $14.6 billion 
in 2003. Once all debt and interest is paid 
off in 2038, the final price tag is estimated 
to reach $22 billion.54 
The independence of the Turnpike 
Authority allowed escalating costs to be 
deferred with little oversight from elected 
officials. The Turnpike was saddled with 
$5 billion in debt, including interest, 
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after borrowing only $1.8 billion. The 
debt payments were so high because the 
authority chose to finance it over 40 years, 
twice as long as most government debt, 
and it had no principal due for the first 
10 years.55 After the Turnpike Authority 
voted to delay a toll increase that had 
been planned since 1997 to pay for the 
Big Dig, two Wall Street bond-rating 
firms downgraded the Turnpike’s finan-
cial status and put its bonds on “credit 
watch negative.”56 
Massport, the quasi-public responsible 
for managing and promoting airports 
and seaports, has also seen its share of 
embarrassing problems, including mis-
guided spending of more than $100,000 
for wining and dining French travel 
agents.57 While improper behavior can-
not be legislated away, full transparency 
of spending forces leaders at quasi-publics 
to defend questionable expenditures. 
“While improper behavior 
cannot be legislated away, 
full transparency of spending 
forces leaders at quasi-publics 
to defend questionable 
expenditures.”
Likewise, timely and thorough exposure 
of contractor overruns encourages ag-
gressive intervention while cost savings 
are still possible, rather than waiting for 
subpoenas years after the billions have 
been spent. 
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The Need for Greater Transparency
In order for Massachusetts to ensure good governance and build trust in its many quasi-public agencies, 
greater transparency is a must. As the 
Association of Government Accoun-
tants notes, “Without accurate fiscal 
information, delivered regularly, in an 
easily-understandable format, citizens 
lack the knowledge they need to interact 
with – and cast informed votes for – their 
leaders. In this regard, a lack of govern-
ment accountability and transparency 
undermines democracy and gives rise 
to cynicism and mistrust.”58
The Commonwealth suffers from 
a lack of open government when it 
comes to budget transparency. All three 
branches of Massachusetts’s government 
claim to be exempt from requirements 
to comply with the state’s public record 
law.59 A national report ranking states 
on the level of open access to official re-
cords found that Massachusetts garnered 
a failing grade of “F.” According to the 
report, which was jointly produced by 
the Better Government Association and 
the National Freedom of Information 
Coalition, the Bay State lacks penalties 
to ensure that officials actually comply 
with Public Record laws and citizens are 
faced with fees for obtaining access to 
public records.60
The Bay State has made some advances 
to improve budget transparency. While 
the mass.gov Web site lists broad bud-
get information for many agencies and 
departments, it does not have the neces-
sary checkbook-level detail included in 
many state Web sites. Massachusetts has 
created a fairly detailed Web site for all 
federal stimulus spending. Massachusetts’ 
separate Comm-PASS Web site (Com-
monwealth Procurement Access and 
Solicitation System) also allows citizens 
to examine an assortment of statewide 
contracts and a few contracts from quasi-
public agencies and local governments. 
All contracts using stimulus funds from 
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the American Reconstruction and Recov-
ery Act were required to use this system. 
Outside of stimulus-funded contracts, 
however, most contracts are not included 
on the Web site and the data is often 
incomplete. 
Expenditure and revenue information 
for most quasi-public agencies, mean-
while, is absent from the state budget 
Web site and only disclosed through a 
patchwork of separate, inconsistent and 
incomplete Web sites and reports – if it 
is disclosed at all.
Lessons from Other States
Over the past decade, officials from 
other states and the federal government 
have taken advantage of the opportunity 
modern technology provides to enhance 
government transparency. The rise of 
the Internet and its ability to disperse 
information quickly and cheaply makes it 
the perfect tool to improve transparency 
and ensure good governance. 
To this end, at least 30 states have 
established centralized Web sites that 
provide checkbook-level data on gov-
ernment contracts and direct spend-
ing.61 The best Web sites allow citizens 
to browse expenditures by broad cat-
egory and to make directed searches 
with access to full text of contracts 
and information about special grants 
and tax breaks. At the federal budget 
transparency portal, for example, visi-
tors can browse expenditures by agency, 
contractor, legislative district, competi-
tion type, or product provided – and 
advanced search options allow citizens 
to make directed searches of each broad 
category.62
These transparency Web sites have 
proven to be extremely cost-effective. 
The Web sites themselves are relatively 
inexpensive to establish and maintain. 
The federal transparency Web site, 
which allows citizens to search federal 
spending totaling over $2 trillion a year, 
required less than $1 million to create. 
Best Practices in Transparency
In an age in which individuals can look up virtually any information they desire with the 
click of a mouse on the Internet, government transparency means more than simply respond-
ing to public records requests made by savvy researchers or dogged citizens. It means making 
information easily available to the public online, increasingly through a central government 
Web site. 
Best transparency practices across the country include Web sites that are:
Comprehensive•	 : Transparency Web sites should include checkbook-level information 
for all government expenditures, including recipient, purpose, amount and date. In 
addition to direct appropriations to government entities, information should also be 
provided for contracts, grants, subgrants, tax credits, and other subsidies. Timely and 
regularly updated information should include quasi-public agencies. Like disclosure 
of grants, disclosure of tax subsidies should include the name of the business entity, 
amount, purpose and achieved results. Provisions should include mechanisms to re-
capture subsidies when recipients do not deliver results.  
One-stop: •	 All government budget information is accessible through a single state 
Web site.
One-click Searchable: •	 Users can browse by broad, common-sense categories and 
make directed keyword and field searches. 
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Missouri’s Web site, which is updated 
daily, was created and maintained entirely 
with existing staff and revenues.63 The 
Web sites often save governments money 
by reducing the number of information 
requests, improving administrative ef-
ficiency, creating more competitive bid-
ding for public projects, and lowering 
the risk of fraud. In Texas, for example, 
the Comptroller was able to utilize the 
transparency Web site to save $2.3 mil-
lion from a variety of efficiencies and cost 
savings.64
Transparency Web sites not only save 
money, but they also improve public con-
fidence in government by allowing people 
to monitor financial decisions. A Harris 
Interactive poll of online Americans 
found that an overwhelming majority – 
90 percent – of Americans believe that 
they are entitled to transparent financial 
management information from their 
government.65 Improved reporting is the 
most commonly cited way respondents 
say government can demonstrate greater 
accountability, especially through open 
disclosure and clear reporting.66 Fully 
73 percent of Americans say that it is 
personally very or extremely important to 
have financial management information 
about their state government available to 
them.67 And this is not some abstract de-
sire. Nearly a third of people polled have 
tried to search the Web for information 
about how their state government gener-
ates and spends taxpayer dollars – searches 
that usually end in frustration.68
In states that have established trans-
parency Web sites, there has been acute 
interest. Less than a year after its launch, 
the Missouri budget transparency Web 
site received more than six million hits.69 
The Texas spending Web site reported 
similar engagement.70 Residents are eager 
to use transparency Web sites to learn 
more about public expenditures.71
Improving Transparency in 
the Commonwealth
In order to improve governance of the 
state’s quasi-public agencies, Massachu-
setts should follow the example of its peers 
and increase budget transparency. All 
quasi-public agencies in the state should 
be required to provide information on 
their budgets in an easily accessible man-
ner. In addition to the checkbook-level 
transparency, the budget reports should 
include detailed information on revenue, 
the issuance of private revenue bonds, 
compensation of high-paid employees, 
subsidies, and contracts or grants given 
to private or nonprofit organizations. 
The information should be provided in a 
timely fashion, and the outcome of each 
expenditure to private entities should be 
recorded (i.e., was the contract fulfilled or 
did the subsidy accomplish its intended 
goal?) These budget reports should not 
only include information on the contracts 
awarded, but they should also report the 
bids received so that people can ensure 
the agencies are pursuing the best-value 
contracts.
This information should be compiled 
and provided online with fully searchable 
format through the state budget Web 
site, mass.gov. This will allow people to 
easily monitor the activities of the agen-
cies without having to pursue informa-
tion through the Massachusetts Public 
Records Law. The comprehensive, 
one-stop Web site would be a significant 
improvement over our current situation. 
It would allow citizens to quickly and 
easily monitor the budgets of quasi-
public agencies to ensure that waste and 
inefficiencies aren’t squandering public 
dollars. And it will probably save the 
state money by reducing corruption and 
improving administrative efficiency.
Increasing budget transparency is a 
critical step in holding quasi-public agen-
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cies accountable. However, it is only the 
first step. Democratic accountability can 
also be enhanced by making governing 
boards more democratic and establish-
ing oversight boards. The establishment 
of oversight boards would also enable 
Massachusetts residents to better monitor 
the activities of these agencies. The Mas-
sachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
Advisory Board, for example, represents 
the cities and towns that fund the T and 
has been responsible for approving the 
MBTA’s 25-year plan and budget. This 
role enables the outside board to monitor 
the MBTA’s budget, and the board has 
historically alerted the public to impend-
ing budget cuts and fare hikes. Though 
the Board’s power was recently reduced, 
similar boards could play important roles 
at other quasi-public agencies.72  
One way to ensure quasi-public boards 
play a strong role in democratic oversight 
is to use additional transparency to en-
sure that board positions do not become 
overpaid sinecures. The Quasi-Public 
Authority Compensation Review Com-
mission recommended that quasi-public 
agencies be required to submit an annual 
review of their compensation processes to 
the legislature and the Executive Office 
of Administration and Finance, and the 
reports should also be placed on the agen-
cies’ Web sites and on mass.gov. These 
would all be positive measures and should 
be integrated into future online budget 
transparency.
Improving the accountability – and 
performance – of quasi-public agencies 
can only happen if we increase the num-
ber of eyes on their functions. When 
their budgets are hidden from the public, 
and there is inadequate oversight of their 
day to day activities, the potential for 
quasi-public agencies to be inefficient or 
wasteful or abuse their independent status 
is high. The Commonwealth has already 
taken many steps towards improving 
transparency, but it must be willing to go 
beyond this to hold quasi-public agencies 
truly accountable.
Recommendations for how to improve 
budget transparency at quasi-public agen-
cies are:
The Commonwealth’s central-•	
ized Web site, mass.gov, should 
provide checkbook-level informa-
tion on individual expenditures for 
all government organizations and 
agencies, including quasi-publics, 
modeled on best practices established 
by at least 30 states. 
In addition to information about •	
direct expenditures, online budget 
disclosure should include detailed 
budgetary information on all 
revenue, the issuance of private 
revenue bonds, compensation for 
board members, subsidies, discre-
tionary spending, and contracts or 
grants given to private entities.
Massachusetts should also consider •	
establishing oversight boards to 
monitor the actions of quasi-public 
agencies and hold them accountable. 
New York state last year established 
an Independent Authorities Budget 
Office to oversee and improve trans-
parency and performance account-
ability for the state’s independent 
authorities, many of which are quasi-
publics.73
Minutes of board meetings should be •	
posted on-line, as should the quali-
fications and compensation of board 
members and upper management.
Contracting at quasi-public agencies •	
should be done through statewide 
transparent procurement, which 
could most easily be accomplished by 
posting all procurement through the 
state’s Comm-PASS system. Doing 
so would also enable these agencies 
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to take advantage of bulk ordering 
discounts enjoyed by other state 
departments, cities and towns.
Quasi-publics should be barred •	
from hiring lobbyists. As part of the 
government themselves, they should 
not use tax dollars to influence legis-
lation or decisions by the Governor’s 
office. The Governor of New Jersey 
in February 2010 ordered that all 
state agencies, authorities, boards 
and commissions stop hiring lobby-
ists. Governor Patrick included a 
similar provision in his FY2011 state 
budget proposal.
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